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UNCERTAINTY, RISK AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS

Joel S. Greenberg
Director, Techno-Economic Analyses
ECON, Inc.
Princeton, New Jersey

ABSTRACT
Many government-sponsored applied research,
development, demonstration and incentive programs
are specifically undertaken to develop technology or
create an environment that will lead to commercial
ventures which will be in the public interest. The
current Administration's emphasis on commerciali
zation has brought to the forefront joint endeavor or
government/industry cooperative agreements and
proposals for divesting operational capabilities to
the private sector. The common thread between all
these activities is the need for government agencies
to plan and evaluate the private sector business
ventures that may result. In the case of the joint
endeavor agreements and divestiture situations, the
evaluation of private sector business ventures is
necessary to establish government negotiating posi
tions.
This paper briefly summarizes private sector finan
cial performance measures and shows how govern
ment actions can affect private sector investment
decisions through a reduction in perceived risk and
shifting the burden of funding from the private sec
tor to the public sector. Data is presented that
illustrates the functional relationship betwen likeli
hood of investment and expected return on invest
ment, risk, payback period and exposure. Finally,
the required public sector financial analysis in sup
port of joint endeavor agreements and divestiture
situations is examined. Many questions and issues
are raised with general procedures developed to
answer a number of these.
INTRODUCTION
Many government-sponsored applied research, de
velopment, demonstration and incentive programs
are specifically undertaken to develop technology or
create an environment that will lead to commercial
ventures which will be in the public interest. For
example, much of the Department of Energy (DOE)
effort is aimed at encouraging commercialization.
Commercialization of new energy technologies is an
important federal goal. Early NASA communication

satellite RD&D efforts also had such a purpose and
led to the formation of the COMSAT Corporation
and ultimately to a broad range of communication
services provided by such companies as RCA,
Western Union, AT&T and Satellite Business Sys
tems. The Department of Transportation under
takes RD&D and other efforts to influence maritime
related investment decisions. For example, pro
grams are currently underway that seek to influence
private sector investment decisions pertaining to
new coal ports [1]. In addition, policies have been
developed to provide tax credits as incentives to
make energy conservation investments and to en
courage business to invest in plant and equipment.
NASA's current space station efforts are also aimed
at the private sector (as well as the public sector).
The space station will permit entry of the private
sector into space by providing a rnicrogravity facili
ty for developing and then manufacturing com
mercial products. Therefore the benefits to be
derived from the development and use of the space
station will, to a certain extent, depend upon pri
vate sector utilization of the space station. Other
NASA efforts aimed at commercialization include
the mobile [2] and 30/20 GHz [3] communication
satellite programs. Both of these are demonstration
programs aimed at influencing private sector invest
ment or commercialization decisions through re
duction of perceived risk and shifting some of the
burden of funding from the private to the public
sector.
The planning of such development and
demonstration programs requires that the public
sector plan and evaluate private sector business
ventures in order to assess the effect of these
programs on private sector investment decisions.
The current Administration's emphasis on com
mercialization has brought to the forefront joint
endeavor or government/industry cooperative agree
ments. These include NASA/industry cooperative
space processing endeavors [4] and low earth orbit
platform endeavors [5]. There has also been an
ever increasing number of divestiture proposals
from both the public and private sectors. These
include NOAA's efforts to commercialize the
LANDSAT and meteorological satellites [6,7], the
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Space Transportation Company's [8] efforts to
commercialize the Space Shuttle, and various pro
posals to commercialize the fleets of expendable
launch vehicles. Commercialization through joint
endeavor agreements or divestiture of government
operations or assets requires negotiating with the
private sector. In order for the public sector to
establish its negotiating positions it is necessary
that the public sector plan and evaluate private
sector business ventures and understand private
sector decision processes.
When government programs are undertaken with the
specific intent of developing technology or creating
an environment that will lead to commercial ven
tures, the desired benefits will not result unless
private sector investment in business ventures re
sults. Under these conditions it is necessay for the
public sector to plan and evaluate private sector
business ventures so that the specific impact of the
government programs on investment decisions can
be assessed. For programs aimed at influencing
private sector investment decisions, there can be no
benefits unless private sector investment decisions
are altered as a result of the public sector pro
grams. This paper deals with such situations and
illustrates how the public sector can explicitly take
into account in its benefit-cost analysis the likely
effect that its programs and policies will have on
private sector investment decisions. In so doing, the
public sector can identify programs and policies that
are more likely to achieve desired goals.
It is argued that the public sector can influence
private sector investment decisions through a re
duction in private sector perceived risk and/or
shifting the burden of funding from the private to
the public sector. Since risk reduction has a major
effect on investment decisions, it is necessary to
perform financial risk analyses. Risk analysis tech
niques are therefore described. Data is presented
which shows that the likelihood of private sector
investment is a function of expected return on
investment, variability or standard deviation of re
turn on investment, expected payback period and
expected maximum exposure. Thus the impact of
government programs and policies must be devel
oped in terms of these variabiles so that the con
sequences can be assessed in terms of changes in the
likelihood of private sector investments. Public
sector benefits are directly related to the change in
investment likelihood that is the result of the public
sector programs or policies.
Finally, joint endeavors or cooperative govern
ment/industry agreements and divestiture situations
are discussed. A number of issues are raised and it
is argued that it is necessary for the public sector to
plan and evaluate private sector business ventures in
order to formulate negotiating positions that will
achieve desired objectives.

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL AND RISK ANALYSIS
Before embarking on a discourse of public/private
sector interactions, it is necessary to have a clear
understanding of several financial performance
measures that are important in private sector de
cisions. After-tax profit is the difference between
revenues and expenses and less taxes. The taxes are
a function of revenues and expenses, carry-forward
losses and investment and other tax credits. Capital
expenditures are not explicitly included in the profit
computation, but occur indirectly (and in any one
year only partially) through the depreciation ex
pense. Depreciation is an allowed expense which
accounts for the wearing out of capital assets. Cash
flow indicates the flow of funds through the business
venture. The cash flow computation includes the
magnitude and timing of the inflow and outflow of
funds. It includes such measures as after-tax profit,
depreciation, capital expenditures and the change in
balance sheet items such as accounts receivable,
accounts payable and inventory. Indebtedness is
defined as the negative of the cumulative cash flow
to any point in time. When indebtedness is positive,
cash outflows have exceeded cash inflows and the
total investment has not been recovered. When
indebtedness is negative, the cumulative cash inflow
exceeds the cumulative cash outflow. The peak of
the indebtedness curve indicates the maximum fund
ing requirement of the business venture. The point
in time at which the indebtedness passes through
zero is the payback period and indicates the time it
takes to recoup the investment. These definitions
Figure 2 illustrates
are illustrated in Figure 1.
simplified profit and cash flow computational pro
cedures.
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summation of the stream of cash flows discounted
to the present according to
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SIMPLIFIED PROFIT AND CASH FLOW COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE

where r is the discount rate or cost of capital. The
return on investment, ROI, is the value of the
discount rate that yields a present value of zero. In
other words, the ROI is the rate of return at which
the time adjusted value of cash outflows is equal to
the time adjusted value of cash inflows. If the ROI
exceeds the cost of capital it is desirable to pursue
the business venture. Frequently, a threshold or
cutoff rate of return or hurdle is established above
the cost of capital. This hurdle rate, which must be
exceeded by the venture's ROI, is a typical approach
used to "compensate" for risk.
The evaluation and planning of new business ven
tures by the private sector is concerned with deter
mining sales potential, profit potential, required
investment (exposure), when investment will be re
turned, cash flow, present value of cash flow, ex
pected rate of return, risk and many other factors.
Their determination is based upon delineating R&D,
operating, engineering, manufacturing and other
costs and expenditures. It is also important, partic
ularly in a new business venture based upon new
technology and new services, to explicitly consider
uncertainty and resulting risk [9,10]. Uncertainty
refers to the subjective assessment of the vari
ability (i.e., a probability density function) of basic
parameters, such as the number of customers for a
specific good or service as a function of time; and
risk refers to the chance that various performance
measures exceed different levels. In the following a
specific measure of risk, the standard deviation of
ROI, is considered.
Figure 2 illustrates the profit and cash flow compu
tations, taking into account uncertainty in the input
data—that is basic input parameters such as unit
sales, selling price, market share, etc., are des
cribed in the form of range of uncertainty and the

form of the uncertainty (i.e., probability density
function). The profit, cash flow and other financial
performance measures are therefore describable as
probability distributions—a convenient form is that
of the "risk profile" as indicated in Figure 2. The
risk profiles (i.e., complement of the cumulative
probability distribution) indicate the chance that the
performance measure will exceed different levels.
To transform the uncertainty profiles into risk pro
files requires the use of a financial simulation or
risk analysis model. The concept of risk analysis—a
formal procedure whereby quantitative estimates of
uncertainty associated with basic input quantities
are converted to risk profiles of performance
measures—is illustrated in Figure 3. In the simpli
fied model shown in Figure 3 revenue (in the I—
time period) is equal to the product of unit sales,
selling price and market share; before-tax profit is
equal to revenue less the sum of all expense items
less the depreciation expense; after-tax profit is one
minus the tax rate multiplied by the bef ore-tax
profit.
The risk analysis [9-12] is performed by random
sampling of the input data (according to the weight
ing of the uncertainty profiles), performing the
computations contained within the simulation
model, saving the results and thence repeating the
process. This process is repeated a large number of
times (Monte Carlo) until a reasonable set of histo
grams can be developed from the saved output data.
These histograms are thence manipulated into the
desired form so as to indicate the variability of
pertinent performance measures such as profit,
cash flow, indebtedness (negative of the cumulative
cash flow to date), rate of return and present worth.
A convenient form, of displaying the performance
measures is that of the "risk profiles" which
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FIGURE 3 . THE CONCEPT OF RISK ANALYSIS

the chance of the performance measure exceeding
specific levels (i.e., the complement of the cumula
tive probability distribution).
To establish the risk profiles, the uncertainty pro
files associated with the basic input parameters
must be established. Informed estimates need to be
made of the ranges of uncertainty of key variables
and their probability distributions within the ranges.
The uncertainty assessments can be made by in
dividuals, or they can be made by an experienced
group of individuals using Delphi-type tech
niques.
These uncertainty estimates are very subjective and
so quantitatively express the attitudes regarding
uncertainties—reflect past experience with similar
efforts, typical problems encountered in the past,
insights into problem areas which might develop,
etc. The uncertainty profiles, being subjective
estimates, call for expert opinion in each area.
Manufacturing personnel should make the estimates
of the uncertainty surrounding manufacturing cost;
marketing personnel should make the estimates of
the uncertainty surrounding the sales forecast and
marketing costs; and so on in every category of
input. Risk analysis demands detailed knowledge of
the factors being evaluated!

C.

Set relative values for the chance of falling
into each interval. (For the Figure 4 case, the
chance of falling into interval 1 is half that of
falling into interval 2).

D.

Having assumed the possibility of falling with
in the range of uncertainty as 1.0, the chance
of falling in each of the five intervals can be
summed and set equal to unity. This equation
can be solved (by substituting the relative
values as obtained in paragraph C) for the
probabilities associated with each interval.

This can become a long procedure when a large
number of uncertainty variables and/or a large num
ber of time intervals must be treated for which
assessments have to be made. To minimize this
problem, a large number of uncertainty profiles are
stored in the computer and pictures of these shown
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to the evaluators. The evaluator then need specify
only the minimum and maximum values and the
name of the applicable uncertainty profile. If the
appropriate uncertainty profile has not been stored,
it can be created by the process just outlined.
Using the risk analysis technique, risk profiles may
be developed for performance measures such as
profit, cash flow, cumulative cash flow or indebted
ness, payback period, return on assets, and return on
investment. Figure 5 shows typical risk profiles of
ROI. The vertical scale represents the probability
(chance), p, of exceeding the various levels of ROI,
indicated by the horizontal scale. In general, the
steeper the curve, the lower the risk (or variability).
When comparing alternatives, it is important to
compare the expected or "most likely" ROI values.
It is equally important to compare risk levels. (Note
that, as per the central-limit theorem, the expected
and "most likely" values of ROI are equal).

— ^ 10

RETURN ON INVESTMENT, ROI

FIGURE 5

TYPICAL RISK PROFILES OF RETURN
ON INVESTMENT

Figure 3 illustrates the ROI risk profiles for hy
pothetical alternatives, A or B. A decision maker
performing a conventional analysis usually evaluates
quantitatively on the "most likely" return on invest
ment. To this uninformed decision maker, alterna
tives A and B "look alike" because they show equal
(p = .5) expected and "most likely" values.
In conventional analysis, the decision maker will try
to pick the alternative yielding maximum ROI or
other performance measure. In risk analysis the
selection process is more difficult. Tradeoffs must
be made between alternatives possessing different
expected present values and associated levels of
risk. When the risk dimension is added, the decision
maker finds alternatives A and B in Figure 5, for
instance, quite different. Alternative A assumes
greater risk (variability) than Alternative B. Thus a
conservative decision maker (averse to risk) would
normally select B (if he does not feel other, unquantified pressures to select alternative A).
The following paragraphs discuss the typical trade
offs that are made with respect to risk (as measured
by the variability or standard deviation of ROI),
expected ROI, payback period and magnitude of the
investment (i.e., exposure).

PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT DECISIONS
In many instances the individual or group of indivi
duals that is responsible for planning and evaluating
a development, demonstration or incentive program
does not have control of the investment decisions
that must be made in order to capitalize upon this
work. Yet in justifying the program it is necessary
to establish a value for the program which derives
from altering investment decisions that are beyond
the planner's control. Since in the planning process
it is not possible to know what future investment
decisions will be with certainty, the future invest
ment decisions can only be described and considered
in terms of the likelihood or chance that they will
be made. Thus, the XYZ Company considering a
synfuel demonstration facility should not take it as
a foregone conclusion that an operational facility
will be implemented if the demonstration is a suc
cess. The likelihood of a decision to implement an
operational facility will be a function of pro forma
performance measures such as annual profit, time of
profitability, return on investment, payback period,
magnitude of investment, risk and others.
A
government agency such as NASA considering dona
ting a Space Shuttle flight as part of a joint
endeavor agreement should not take as a foregone
conclusion that the private sector will make addi
tional investments necessary to establish an ongoing
business venture. The value of the NASA program
should consider the likelihood that the private
sector will make these investments where the likeli
hood is a function of pro forma performance
measures such as profit, retun on investment, pay
back period and others.
Important determinants of private sector invest
ment have been found to be expected value, m, and
variability (risk), a, of return on investment, ROI,
expected payback period and expected exposure. To
measure the functional relationship that exists in
practice—the key to establishing the effect of risk
and other financial performance measures on invest
ment decisions—a survey of executives was con
ducted under the auspices of the American Manage
ment Associations [13]. Persons queried had the
titles of Vice President, Finance; Controller;
Treasurer or Director of Corporate Planning. The
results of the survey are illustrated in Figures 6, 7
and 8 where expected ROI, risk (i.e., the standard
deviation of ROI), payback period and exposure (the
ratio of the maximum funding required to the bud
get of the decision makers).
Figure 6 illustrates the investment likelihood for the
manufacturing sector. The specific set of curves is
for a four year payback period and an investment
that is between 1 and 10 percent of the capital
budget. The scales are normalized to the firms1 cost
of capital. Thus the vertical scale represents the
expected ROI as a fraction of the cost of capital
(1.0 indicates that the ROI is equal to the cost of
capital). The horizontal scale represents the risk or
standard deviation of ROI as a fraction of the cost
of capital. The curves represent contours of equal
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likelihood or probability of investment. The line
marked 0.8 indicates that those investments that
are characterized by points (m, <r) that fall on this
line have, a priori, an 80 percent chance of re
ceiving funding. There is an 80 percent chance of
an investment when the decision makers perceive an
expected ROI that is 1.5 times the cost of capital
and a level of risk (standard deviation of ROI) that
is 0.2 times the cost of capital (see point B in
Figure 6). Point A represents the expected ROI and
standard deviation that would result in the absence
of the development or demonstration program.
Points B and C result from the pursuit of different
development or demonstration programs. More will
be said about this in following paragraphs.
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Figures 7 and 8 summarize the investment likelihood
in terms of magnitude of investment and payback
period. It should be noted that there is a very
definite rotation of the curves in terms of both
0.0
investment magnitude and payback period. The
rotation indicates the risk avoidance preferences in
terms of payback period and investment magnitude,
i.e., small expenditures and short payback period
investments obviously have the highest likelihood of FIGURE 8
being funded. The curves indicate these riskavoidance preferences quantitatively.
The significance of the investment likelihood curves
as a function of financial performance measures can
be grasped by noting that the expected benefits, B,
from a public sector program undertaken to in
fluence private sector investment decisions is given
by

EFFECT OF INVESTMENT MAGNITUDE ON IN
VESTMENT LIKELIHOOD IN TERMS OF EX
PECTED ROI AND RISK—4 YEAR PAYBACK
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STANDARD DEVIATION OF ROI AS A FRACTION
OF THE COST OF CAPITAL

EFFECT OF PAYBACK ON INVESTMENT LIKE
LIHOOD IN TERMS OF EXPECTED ROI AND
RISK--INVESTMENT IS 1-10% OF CAPITAL
BUDGET
B = <*B x NPV B - «A x NPV A - PVC

where NPV R and NPV, are the expected public
sector net present value "of benefits with and with
out the development, demonstration or incentive
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program respectively. The values of NPV. and
NPVo can be determined using benefit-cost analysis
to establish public sector benefits. PVC is the
expected present value of the cost of the public
sector program, a and a are the probabilities of
private sector investment with and without the
public sector program respectively as obtained from
the investment likelihood curves. It is immediately
apparent that the difference between <* and <* has
a major effect on public sector benefits. It isalso
evident (from Figure 6) that the value of a should
not arbitrarily be taken as 1.0 with the public sector
program and 0.0 without the public sector program.
The appropriate value of a can only be established
by planning and evaluating private sector business
ventures explicitly taking into account quantitative
estimates of uncertainty and the effect of the
public sector program on these uncertainties. The
overall evaluation procedure is summarized in
Figure 9 where the assumed impact of the public
sector program is a reduction of the uncertainty
associated with sales.
To summarize, public sector development, demon
stration and incentive programs are undertaken to
1) reduce performance uncertainty, 2) reduce cost
uncertainty, 3) reduce market uncertainty, and
4) reduce private sector exposure (the maximum
required investment as indicated by the peak of the
indebtedness curve—see Figure 1). The impact on
the private sector is through a reduction in private
sector perceived risk and/or exposure with the in
creased likelihood of the private sector developing
and marketing beneficial goods and/or services.
Risk analyses must be performed to obtain the
financial performance measures that are necessary
to establish the investment likelihood.
The typical effect of a demonstration program is
illustrated in Figure 10 in terms of the performance
measures previously defined. Figure 10A illustrates
the effect of full investment, including the demon
stration program, by the private sector. The degree
of variability of exposure (maximum of the indebt
edness curve), payback period and ROI is indicated.
A large part of the variability is due to the un
certainty of the cost and outcome of the demonstra
tion program. Figure 10B illustrates the impact on
the private sector of NASA undertaking the demon
stration satellite program with no transfer payment
from the private sector to NASA. Note that private
sector exposure is reduced as is the variability of
exposure, payback period and ROI. At the same
time the expected ROI is increased. This is due to
the uncertainty in the cost and outcome of the
demonstration program being eliminated (private
sector decisions can await the outcome of the NASA
program) as well as the private sector demonstra
tion program funding requirement being eliminated.
Figure 10C indicates the impact of a NASA demon
stration program when a payment is made to NASA
from the private sector for using the resulting
demonstration satellite in an operational system.
The impact of the payment is to increase expected
exposure and payback period and to reduce expected
ROI. Note that there is no change (relative to

Figure 10B) in the variability of the performance
measures. It is obvious that the business venture
under scenario B is more desirable than under scen
ario C, which is more desirable than under scen
ario A. It is also obvious that the course of govern
ment action can affect the likelihood of the private
sector undertaking the hypothetical business ven
ture. Since NASA benefits are a function of private
sector investment decisions, NASA benefits will
differ for each of the scenarios.
The impact of risk, expected ROI, payback and
exposure is illustrated in Figure 6 in terms of the
likelihood of private sector investment, a. The three
alternatives shown in Figure 10 are indicated in
Figure 6 as the previously discussed points A, B and
C and demonstrate the role of the public sector in
affecting private sector investment decisions
through perceived risk reduction and shifting the
burden of funding from the private to the public
sector. It should be noted in passing that the effect
of a recoupment policy (i.e., payback to NASA for
service rendered) is to drive point B toward point C
and thus reduce the likelihood of private sector
investment. It is, of course, desirable for a govern
ment agency to be paid for services rendered, but
this must be tempered by its effect on total bene
fits—the true objective is maximization of benefits.
SOME COMMERCIALIZATION ISSUES
The current Administration is placing increased em
phasis on commercialization of space systems and
technologies. This has led to government agencies,
NASA and NOAA in particular, into a new are
na—the planning and evaluation of private sector
business ventures and the entering into joint en
deavor or government/industry cooperative agree
ments and the divestiture of government assets and
capabilities to the private sector. Currently under
consideration or in force are NASA/industry joint
endeavor agreements concerning space processing
ventures and a small low-earth orbiting platform
business venture. Divestitures currently under con
sideration includes the Delta, Atlas/Centaur and
Space Shuttle Transportation systems and the earth
observation and meteorological satellite systems.
Each of the joint endeavors requires the partici
pating government agency to provide a service or
make a commitment such as a guarantee to utilize a
product or service. This is undertaken with the
objective of inducing the private sector to make
investments that will lead to business ventures in
the public interest—that is, to achieve benefits from
the government programs. Divestitures are con
sidered when the private sector is capable and
interested in providing services that have previously
been provided or developed by a government agency.
This may or may not be accomplished more ef
fectively by the private sector, but the private
sector desires to try.
Turning attention to joint endeavor or cooperative
agreements, it is the purpose of these agreements to
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effect private sector investment decisions through
risk reduction and/or shifting the burden of funding
from the private to the public sector. Using NASA
as an example, NASA is normally expected to con
tribute in the form of providing launch and related
services with payment foregone or delayed, or to
commit to the partaking of services or products to
be offered by the private sector business venture.
Note that the former contribution results in increas
ing expected ROI, reducing payback period and
reducing the exposure by shifting the burden of
funding from the private to the public sector. The
latter contribution results primarily in reducing per
ceived risk by reducing market uncertainties.

concerning a low-earth-orbiting spacecraft business
venture such as LEASECRAFT [5] is illustrated in
Figure 11. The objective of such analyses are to
establish NASA negotiating position with respect to
what it can afford (as well as the form) to give up in
order to effect the proposed venture. For example,
a hypothetical situation is shown in Figure 12 and
illustrates the effect of a donated Space Shuttle
flight and guarantee to limited purchase of ser
vices—the former effects expected ROI and the
latter effects perceived risk. In the hypothetical
example both yield a .50 percent chance of private
sector investment but the former is accompanied by
a cost. The latter situation is therefore preferred.

There are many questions that should be answered
concerning proposed joint venture agreements
among which are the following. Does the con
templated private sector business venture (that will
result from the agreement) make financial sense
without the NASA commitment? With the NASA
commitment? What is the chance that the private
sector will initiate the business venture without the
NASA investment? With the NASA investment?
Does the change in the investment likelihood war
rant the commitment requested of NASA? Are the
resulting benefits to NASA worth the NASA "invest
ment"? In order to answer these types of questions
it is often necessary to perform an independent
assessment of the proposed business ventures. This
entails, in some cases, independent market assess
ments and sales forecasts and the formulation of a
business venture including estimates of revenues,
expenses, costs and capital expenditures. A typical
assessment of a proposed joint endeavor agreement

As already pointed out many divestiture situations
are developing. However there are not many exam
ples in the U.S. of the planned divestiture of public
sector capabilities to the private sector. In the
private sector a divestiture often represents an
attempt to improve cash flow or to realign cor
porate capabilities with new business objectives. In
the case of the public sector divestiture, it is
important to understand and quantify the benefits to
the public of the proposed transfer. Moreover, in
some cases the government will corrtinue (at least
for some period of time) to purchase some part of
the services provided by the new private sector
venture. For example, in the event of the divesti
ture of weather or earth observation space systems,
the government would undoubtedly be a major pur
chaser of data products.
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DONATED
FLIGHT +
GUARANTEE

Transportation System as well as the expendable
launch vechiles (ELY). These proposals are likely to
suggest that NASA facilities and/or people be trans
ferred to or perform services for the proposed
ventures. What should NASA be paid for lease or
transfer of facilities, people and/or services? What
will be the pricing policy of the proposed venture
and what effect will it have on the cost of NASA
missions? What effect will the pricing policy (for
example, a commercialized Delta launch vehicle)
have on the utilization and hence the pricing of the
Space Shuttle? What happens if the business ven
ture (i.e., the commercialized launch vehicles) is not
profitable? Is the transportation capability lost, or
is there an implied NASA guarantee for continuity
of service? If failure of the business venture is due
to competitive forces, does this imply the lack of
need for the specific launch vehicles? Will private
sector goals and objectives be similar to those of
NASA (this is extremely important if the divestiture
is not of the complete system)? If not, what
problems are likely to arise?
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/ v
/ \
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In order to answer questions such as these, govern
ment agencies must perform analyses such as in
dicated in Figure 13. At the heart of this is a
financial analysis of the proposed business venture.
The financial analysis, if performed parametrically
in terms of pricing policies and recoupment polices,
can shed light on the government agencies1 appro
priate negotiating positions.
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The subject of commercialization cannot be closed
without a comment on government subsidization.
Irrespective of a common belief there is indeed a
place for subsidization if the subsidization will alter
private sector investment decisions to initiate busi
ness ventures that will produce public or societal
benefits that exceed the cost of the subsidization.
Subsidization has a place when a pricing mechanism
does not exist for the services rendered. For
example, consider the provision of improved emer
gency medical communications services via satel
lite. It has been shown that thousands of trauma
victims lives could be saved annually from improved
EMS communications—this, if converted to a dollar
value, is equivalent to many hundreds of millions of
dollars per year. A commercial business venture to
provide these services would, however, have revenue
based upon the number of telephone calls, their
duration and price. In short there is no viable
pricing mechanism that can be related to the value
of a human life saved as a result of the improved
EMS communications. Thus large societal benefits
have been foregone because the private sector has
not found a mechanism to provide profitable EMS
communciatiosn services—it is possible that subsidi
zation could alter this.

exposure. This quantitative data is the link between
public sector actions and private sector investment
decisions.
REFERENCES
[1]

Greenberg, J.S. and D.T. Palmer, Ship Coal
Bunkering Facilities, Report No. MA-RD-92082012, March 1982.

[2]

Lovell, R.R., G.H. Knouse and W.J. Weber, An
Experiment to Enable Commercial Mobile
Satellite Service, National Telecommunica
tions Conference, Galveston, Texas, November
1982.

[3]

Technological Priorities for Future Satellite
Communications, Office of the Director,
NASA, Goddard Space Flight Center, July
1978.

[4]

Space Industrialization, Science Applications,
Inc., April 1978, prepared under NASA Con
tract NAS8-32197.

[5]

Lowndes, J.C., Fairchild, NASA Agree on
LEASECRAFT, Aviation Week & Space Tech
nology, October 18, 1982.

With the increasing emphasis being placed upon [6]
commercialization of space systems and tech
nologies, it is necessary for government agencies to
develop new skills and techniques in order to per
form the required assessments and evaluations. As
joint endeavor and divestitures are proposed it is [7]
necessary for government agencies to establish the
desirability of the proposals and to establish the
appropriate role of the government agencies in the
proposed endeavors and divestitures. In many in- [8]
stances the contemplated role is that of providing
incentives in the form of donated Space Shuttle
flights or guarantees to utilize the provided, pro
ducts or services. In other cases the contemplated [9]
role is that of providing facilities, personnel or
services. What is appropriate in order to increase
the likelihood of commercialization and achieve the [10]
desired benefits?

Resolution of Issues Related to Private Sector
Transfer of Civil Land Observing Satellite
Activities, Memorandum from OMB, July 13,
1981.

SUMMARY

To answer the foregoing question requires that the
government agencies plan and evaluate private sec- [11]
tor business ventures. It is through the analysis of
the business ventures that the impact of alternative
government actions can be determined. In essence,
the government agencies perform financial analyses
to establish their negotiating positions.
[12]
Public sector actions can effect private sector in
vestment decision by reducing perceived risk and
shifting the burden of funding from the private to
the public sector. The likelihood of private sector [13]
investments is a function of many financial per
formance measures. Quantitative data has been
presented that shows the functional relationship
between investment likelihood and expected ROI,
risk (standard deviation of ROI), payback period and
IIIC-25

Commercialization of Civil Remote Sensing,
Communications Satellite Corp., October 22,
1982.
Couvault, C., NASA Planning for Shift of
Shuttle, Aviation Week & Space Technology,
November 1, 1982.
Greenberg, J.S., Risk Analysis, Astronautics
and Aeronautics, November 1974.
Hertz, D., Investment Policies That Pay Off,
Harvard Business Review, January-February
1968.
Greenberg, J.S. and F. Edelman, Venture An
alysis: The Assessment of Uncertainty and
Risk, Financial Executive, Vol. 37, No. 8,
August 1969.
Greenberg, J.S., A Financial Risk Analysis of a
District Heating Business Venture, Pro
ceedings of the 13th Intersociety Energy Con
version Engineering Conference, August 1980.
Greenberg, J.S., Investment Decisions; The
Influence of Risk and Other Factors, American
Management Associations, New York, 1982.

